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INTRODUCTION
In her twenty plus years on the United States Supreme Court, Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg has issued momentous decisions and significant dissents
concerning constitutional guarantees of equality. She is best known for her
leadership—as an advocate, scholar, judge, and justice—on issues of gender
discrimination.1 Although one might expect related commitments to civil liberties
to shape cases concerning the criminal justice process, Justice Ginsburg’s mark on
constitutional criminal procedure appears comparatively faint. Her contributions
have been subtle,2 and her cautious opinions at first seem disconnected from the
clear principles established in the discrimination cases.3
Yet when Justice Ginsburg’s criminal procedure decisions are considered
through the lens of her broader jurisprudence on equality, some common
commitments emerge. The argument for “equal citizenship stature”4 relates to her
efforts to remove the systematic barriers to entry that preclude access to the courts
in criminal cases. Here too she seeks to protect the dignity of defendants facing
official power. And through careful engagement with the facts of each case and a
consistent focus on the prerequisites to fair adjudication, she has highlighted the
due process obligations of prosecutors, demanded adequate representation of
defendants, expanded the right to confront witnesses, and increased the jury’s
control over sentencing determinations.
This chapter reconsiders Justice Ginsburg’s understated but important
criminal procedure legacy. Notably, a comprehensive bibliography documenting
her own prolific writings, together with the academic commentary and assorted
tributes published through her first ten years on the Court, lists hundreds of
publications, but not a single one concerning criminal procedure.5 Part I assesses
the perception of Justice Ginsburg’s muted voice in the field. It describes her role
in protecting existing trial rights from encroachment and articulating new
requirements of procedural equality, and also characterizes those cases as
consonant with her incremental approach. Justice Ginsburg’s contributions have
received little attention in part because her disposition to caution often produces
outcomes that appear to favor the government, at least in the short term. Her
opinion for the Court in Perry v. New Hampshire,6 for example, surprised some
observers by rejecting any special reliability screening for suggestive eyewitness
identifications,7 and Part I concludes with a discussion of that case.
When Justice Ginsburg writes from an internal perspective on the courts,
however, and shifts her focus from reliability to opportunity, the volume of her
voice increases. Part II describes Justice Ginsburg’s efforts to ensure meaningful
access to the criminal courts. Her opinions appear most animated when they
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concern an aspect of the criminal justice process that reinforces inequality. And
that concern may have found its fullest expression in a civil case: Connick v.
Thompson.8 In Connick, Justice Ginsburg issued a fierce dissent from the Court’s
decision to vacate a damages award in favor of a defendant who was wrongfully
convicted after prosecutors suppressed exculpatory evidence.9
Part III connects Justice Ginsburg’s advocacy for meaningful access to the
criminal courts to her dedication to fair treatment in other realms. Intellectual
history and personal experience complicate any justice’s jurisprudence, and it can
be difficult to trace beliefs in one area to decisions in another. Legacies are not
always linear, but this chapter suggests that Justice Ginsburg’s legacy is more
integrated than previously thought. There is an unexplored connection between
her perception of the role of the courts in remedying unfairness in the
discrimination cases and in lowering barriers to entry in the criminal justice
process.

I. INCREMENTAL PROTECTIONS AND RESTRAINED DECISIONS
Justice Ginsburg’s criminal procedure jurisprudence appears mild because
she has acted primarily to preserve existing liberties rather than to expand
constitutional protections. By and large, she seems less active on behalf of
criminal defendants than “one might expect from a Justice appointed by a
Democratic president and hailing from the ACLU.”10 This perception is in
keeping with “progressive criticism of Justice Ginsburg as an excessively cautious
jurist.”11 And some commentators report the defense bar’s assessment that her
“support of defense-oriented positions is somewhat lacking in intensity” and thus
has not had a significant impact.12 Though she has in fact voted more frequently
to protect defendants than most of her colleagues on the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts, Justice Ginsburg’s record does not appear to favor defendants as much as
the decisions of progressive icons such as Justices Brennan and Marshall did.13
This is so in part because Justice Ginsburg’s intellectual instincts on the
Court, as with her earlier litigation strategies, have been incremental across
substantive areas of the law. As an advocate, she challenged classifications based
on gender discrimination one at a time rather than attempting to prevail on a new
constitutional theory aimed at broad social change. Often celebrated for these
measured steps in the direction of what were ultimately historic advances in
gender equality, Justice Ginsburg has repeatedly cited slow but steady forward
motion as her preferred speed on the bench as well.14 Indeed, she has selfidentified as given to interstitial action, an approach that she believes “affords the
most responsible room for creative, important judicial contributions.”15 She favors
narrow rules, adheres closely to established precedents, and generally avoids
grand pronouncements.16 Her conception of the judicial role, as she stated in her
confirmation hearings, is to “get it right and keep it tight.”17 This layered, gradual,
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common-law approach to social progress extends to abortion rights, and Justice
Ginsburg has famously expressed concern that the landmark Roe v. Wade18
decision was an ill-timed sudden move that “ventured too far.”19
Pragmatism characterizes many of Justice Ginsburg’s criminal procedure
decisions as well. She has employed her incremental approach not only to slowly
advance social change but also to defend the remnants of Warren Court
precedents. The Warren Court extended the right to counsel to indigent
defendants charged with felonies, required that suspects undergoing custodial
interrogation be advised of their right to remain silent and consult an attorney, and
applied the exclusionary rule to state-court suppression of evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.20 Justice Ginsburg has served on the Court
during an era of erosion in those and other criminal procedure rights. Although
approximately half of her decisions could be categorized as favoring the
government, she often carefully constructs a narrow majority ruling, drafts a
concurrence that mitigates the impact of the decision, or dissents to lay down a
marker against future encroachment.21 As Christopher Slobogin has observed,
“rather than lambasting the majority for its blindness or illogic in broad and farreaching language, [her] concurrences pay close attention to precedent and rely on
precise ‘lawyerly’ analysis detailing how narrow the majority ruling is, or could
be construed to be.”22
In relation to other areas of the law, Justice Ginsburg has garnered few
marquee opinion assignments concerning criminal procedure. Some of the
majority opinions that she has authored fit within this narrow, cautious genre. One
closely-followed decision, Perry v. New Hampshire,23 concerned eyewitness
identifications. Members of the defense community hoped the Court would
address growing skepticism of eyewitness testimony, which is often persuasive
evidence against criminal defendants, but flawed in terms of reliability. The
Court, however, concluded that a fair opportunity for the defense to raise the
soundness of an identification before a jury was sufficient to assure due process,
even if the identification was made under suggestive circumstances.24
The witness in the Perry case had called the police to report seeing an
African American man allegedly breaking into cars in the parking lot of her
apartment complex. When the police arrived and questioned the witness in her
apartment, the witness pointed out her kitchen window at a suspect, Barion Perry,
standing in the parking lot. A month later, however, the witness could not identify
Perry in a photo array. And at the time of the initial identification, Perry was
standing next to a police officer in the still-dark parking lot, and was the only
African American person there. Perry was charged with theft by unauthorized
taking and criminal mischief, and he moved to suppress the parking lot
identification on the ground that admission of a suggestive one-person show-up
would violate due process. The New Hampshire trial court denied the motion and
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admitted the identification. Perry was convicted of theft and appealed through the
state courts to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court affirmed. Due process concerns, it reasoned, arise
only when law-enforcement officers introduce the suggestive element themselves,
and the improper police conduct creates a “substantial likelihood of
misidentification.”25 In reaching that decision, Justice Ginsburg frustrated some
observers by disregarding the mounting social science evidence calling the
reliability of eyewitness identifications into question.26 She reasoned, however,
that the Constitution protected the defendant not by excluding the evidence but by
affording an opportunity to persuade the jury that it is not credible.
Perry exemplifies Justice Ginsburg’s emphasis on in-court process over
on-the-street policing. She generally views law enforcement from a practical
perspective, and she has imposed few new constraints on investigative practices.
Justice Sotomayor presents something of a contrast, with notable decisions
advancing a more expansive and technologically savvy understanding of privacy
under the Fourth Amendment,27 objecting to the narrowing scope of Fifth
Amendment Miranda protections in custodial interrogations,28 and dissenting
from the Court’s due process analysis in Perry itself.29
Justice Ginsburg’s Perry opinion also reveals the way in which she
privileges the context of the adversarial process over content-based exclusions. It
is in keeping, for example, with her alliance with Justice Scalia to establish a
reinvigorated Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses, no longer tethered to
the reliability of the hearsay statement a witness made.30 “The potential
unreliability of a type of evidence,” she wrote in Perry, “does not alone render its
introduction at the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.”31 Justice Ginsburg
further deferred to state and lower federal courts on the question whether evidence
is sufficiently reliable to be admitted.
Where Justice Ginsburg does act to strengthen protections against law
enforcement intrusion, it is often because she perceives a need to discourage
misconduct. In Perry, for example, she noted the limited deterrence value of a
contrary ruling, concluding that it would be difficult to dissuade law enforcement
from engineering identifications through a case where only external facts and
circumstances gave rise to the suggestiveness.32 In other cases, however, she has
resisted unfair manipulation of investigations, and objected to governmental endruns around the rules.
For example, Justice Ginsburg has often advocated rules designed to
prevent law enforcement from gaming encounters with suspects. As she
acknowledged in Perry, police misconduct represents a systematic failure that
raises a due process problem and may require an exclusionary remedy. In a recent
Fourth Amendment case, Kentucky v. King,33 she dissented to underscore the
dangers of police-created exigencies.34 Likewise, she has been vigilant about
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police manipulation when it comes to the requirement of Miranda warnings,
favoring a broad definition of “custody.”35 In addition, she has insisted that
something more than an anonymous tip is required before an officer can claim
reasonable suspicion for a stop,36 and she recently expressed concern that police
may dodge the warrant requirement by removing a party who refuses to consent
to a search from the premises.37 She has also opposed efforts to “constrict the
domain of the exclusionary rule” to deterrence, fearing that would create perverse
incentives for law enforcement to neglect the electronic databases that “form the
nervous system of contemporary criminal justice operations.”38
Overall, however, Justice Ginsburg proceeds from the premise that what
happens in court matters more than how defendants got there. Her opinions
suggest that individuals can best confront the power of the state from within the
criminal justice process. And where the right to be heard has been vindicated,39
then the adversarial system adequately protects equality and fairness. Perry helps
to illuminate where her commitments lie. The core of her reasoning in Perry is
that the trial process—including the right to counsel, the right to cross examine
witnesses, the rules of evidence, expert testimony, carefully crafted jury
instructions, and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt—suffices to
caution juries against placing undue weight on flawed eyewitness testimony.40

II. OPPORTUNITY JURISPRUDENCE AND AN INTERNAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE COURTS
Justice Ginsburg’s contributions to criminal procedure stem primarily
from her attention to the power of individual defendants within the trial process
rather than constraints on the power of the state. Where she perceives a fair
playing field, Justice Ginsburg has often authored or joined pro-government
decisions.41 It is true that those decisions exist in some tension with her
progressive instincts in other contexts.42 But adjudicative criminal procedure often
upends expectations in this way because it can create unusual affinities. For
example, although Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor vote together often,
they diverge in many criminal procedure cases. Justice Sotomayor’s focus on
expanding constitutional rights can put her at odds with Justice Ginsburg’s trialprocess approach. In contrast, Justice Ginsburg’s vigilance about procedural
safeguards has led her to support a less-frequent ally, Justice Scalia, in his
decisions redefining the Confrontation Clause and expanding the domain of the
jury.43
Moreover, Justice Ginsburg shares with some of her colleagues an internal
perspective and a commitment to ensuring fairness within the existing system of
criminal adjudication rather than changing its parameters. Even on a Court
composed almost entirely of former appellate judges,44 Justice Ginsburg stands
out as a “lawyer’s lawyer” and “judge’s judge.”45 Whether appellate judges bring
common temperaments and techniques to the docket is an open question. When
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William Rehnquist joined the Court in 1972, former federal judges were in the
minority, and earlier Courts had members with substantially more experience as
governors, legislators, and cabinet members.46 Empirical studies have questioned
Chief Justice Roberts’s contention that appellate judges on the Court are more
likely to follow precedent and set aside policy preferences.47 But he has recently
made more nuanced statements about the justices’ shared internal perspective on
the Court’s place in the American political process. In a 2013 appearance before
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Chief Justice Roberts
acknowledged that some of the questions before the Court might benefit from a
broader view of public policy but could only be evaluated by the current Court
through a “focused way of drilling in on the law.”48
A hallmark of Justice Ginsburg’s jurisprudence is that she is indeed adept
at “drilling in on the law,” and even more so at closely reading the factual
record.49 A meticulous review of the details of a case and the procedural
complexities comports with her deliberate approach. But even through that
lawyerly lens, Justice Ginsburg has a long view. She fully understands how
litigation relates to policy and how to patiently pursue a principle through
individual cases that are sometimes many years apart. She is not only one of the
most seasoned litigators on the current Court but also the Court’s most significant
social movement advocate at present. She has firsthand experience of the eventual
interplay between judicial decisionmaking and increased opportunity.50
Accordingly, over time, her constitutional criminal procedure decisions
have helped to balance the government’s power in the trial process. Even where
she has not actively expanded defendant’s rights, she has identified the “practical
obstacles” to protecting those rights and has advocated the removal of those
barriers.51 She has, for example, rejected executive branch attempts to shift
prosecutions arising from the war on terror away from the purview of the federal
courts.52 And she has guarded the right to be heard and mount a defense,53 and the
opportunity to cross examine witnesses and present facts to a jury.54
Perhaps Justice Ginsburg’s primary concern in criminal cases has been
ensuring that neither lack of means nor limited procedural prowess shuts
defendants out of court. She has been particularly dedicated to preserving the
right to counsel.55 In Alabama v. Shelton,56 she extended the right to counsel to
proceedings where the defendant receives a suspended sentence.57 Defendants
who decide to appeal from a guilty plea also require counsel, as she argued in
Halbert v. Michigan.58 The state should never, she wrote, “bolt the door to equal
justice” when indigent defendants seek appellate review of criminal convictions.59
Nor should defendants be left without counsel when confronted with the
complexities of the adversarial system. Ever practical, Justice Ginsburg has noted
that 68 percent of the prison population did not complete high school and may
lack basic literacy skills, and that alone can bar entry to the courts.60 She also has
written separately to underscore that procedural requirements are “a tall order for
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a defendant of marginal literacy,”61 to express concern about uncounseled
convictions for driving under the influence,62 and to suggest that judges are
obligated to warn pro se litigants about the consequences of their legal
decisions.63
The right-to-counsel cases fundamentally implicate Justice Ginsburg’s
commitment to fair access, and she views the function of public defenders
broadly. She recognizes that there are “systematic failures across the country in
the provision of defense counsel services to the indigent.”64 To begin to address
those problems, she has argued for “expanding the situations in which the right to
counsel obtains” and “policing the implementation of the right.”65 In Maples v.
Thomas,66 for example, she wrote a spare but searing description of the minimal
resources and training supporting defense lawyers in capital cases in Alabama.67
In that light, she found no procedural default when an attorney’s abandonment of
a client resulted in a missed deadline, which would have arbitrarily denied the
defendant his “day in court.”68 And in Vermont v. Brillon,69 she concluded that
“delay resulting from a systematic breakdown in the public defender system”
could be charged to the state.70 She has also stated that she has “yet to see a death
case, among the dozens coming to the Supreme Court on eve-of-execution stay
applications, in which the defendant was well represented at trial.”71 Because she
entrusts defense lawyers with maintaining some balance in the adversarial
process, Justice Ginsburg has also held counsel to a high standard.72
Furthermore, a robust view of the jury’s role follows from Justice
Ginsburg’s belief that safeguards in the adversarial trial best ensure fairness.73 She
has dissented in death penalty cases to underscore the importance of clear
instructions to juries on the choices they confront.74 And she allied herself with
Justice Scalia in a series of decisions on jury determinations of sentencing facts.
She voted with the majority in Apprendi v. New Jersey,75 which requires jury
findings of aggravating factors that increase criminal sentences beyond statutory
maximums.76 She later authored related opinions requiring that facts supporting a
capital sentence be found by a jury,77 and prohibiting judges from making factual
findings giving rise to higher potential sentences.78 In a 2005 sentencing case,
United States v. Booker,79 Justice Ginsburg’s concern with mandatory sentencing
guidelines encountered her resistance to abrupt systematic change.80 She was the
only justice to join the majority opinions on both substance and remedy, first
agreeing that the mandatory federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the jury trial
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, but then joining with four different
colleagues to conclude that the appropriate remedy was to give judges the
discretion to apply them. Despite the decisive impact of switching her vote, she
did not write at all in the case.
What may be the most telling criminal procedure opinion authored by
Justice Ginsburg actually came in a civil case. Her dissent from the Court’s
decision in Connick v. Thompson81 highlights the connection between fair play by
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prosecutors and the right to be heard. It involves a defendant first denied access to
exculpatory evidence necessary to his criminal trial and then stripped of the
remedy he received in civil court for his related constitutional claim.
The case arises from the wrongful conviction of John Thompson for
robbery and murder. Thompson spent eighteen years in prison for those
convictions, fourteen of them on death row in solitary confinement twenty-three
hours a day.82 During his robbery trial, prosecutors withheld several pieces of
exculpatory evidence, including a blood sample from the robbery crime scene
establishing that the perpetrator’s blood type was B.83 Though prosecutors did not
test Thompson’s blood (which is type O), neither did they disclose to the defense
that the forensic evidence, and a lab report conclusively identifying the
perpetrator’s blood type, existed. In fact, they took pains to conceal it by
removing it from the property room during pretrial discovery. Prosecutors then
used the robbery conviction to seek the death penalty in the subsequent murder
trial, and to preclude Thompson from testifying in his own defense because of the
impeachment effect of the prior conviction.
A defense investigator came across a microfiche copy of the laboratory
report in police archives just before Thompson’s sixth scheduled execution date in
2003.84 The blood evidence ruled out Thompson’s involvement in the robbery,
and the trial court vacated that conviction. Thompson was also granted a new trial
on the murder charge because the prosecution’s “egregious” misconduct and
intentional concealment of exculpatory evidence had prevented him from
presenting a defense and testifying at trial. Upon retrial, Thompson was acquitted
of the murder and released.
Thompson then sued for the violation of his federal civil rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to Brady v. Maryland,85 due process requires the
government to disclose to the defense any evidence in its possession that is both
favorable and material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment.86 Thompson
alleged that the New Orleans District Attorney’s deliberate indifference to the
need to train prosecutors on their constitutional obligations caused a constitutional
violation. The central question was whether the harm to Thompson resulted from
the District Attorney acting in his official capacity, or from the individual and
independent violations of rogue prosecutors.87 A jury found the District
Attorney’s Office liable and awarded Thompson $14 million in damages. The
Fifth Circuit sustained the award, but in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice
Thomas, the Supreme Court concluded that the District Attorney’s Office could
not be held liable for a single incident of wrongdoing.
In order to prevail, Thompson needed to demonstrate that the District
Attorney was deliberately indifferent to the need to train his prosecutors about
Brady’s command, and that the lack of training led to the Brady violation. An
earlier case, Canton v. Harris,88 had established that deliberate indifference may
be shown when a policymaker ignores a pattern of similar constitutional
8
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violations by untrained employees.89 The Court in Thompson held, however, that
the District Attorney was entitled to rely on prosecutors’ general professional
training and ethical obligations. Although the case was the third before the
Supreme Court concerning misconduct by the New Orleans District Attorney’s
Office,90 the Court also concluded that Thompson failed to show the necessary
pattern of deliberate indifference to the constitutional obligation.91
Justice Ginsburg would have upheld the damages award in light of the
“gross, deliberately indifferent, and long-continuing violation of [Thompson’s]
fair trial right.”92 The case serves as a self-contained demonstration of both the
importance of enforcing Brady requirements and the role of section 1983 liability
in doing so. Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg let the facts speak for themselves and
dedicated her dissent—joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan—to a
“lengthy excavation of the trial record.”93
By exposing the root causes and net effects of pervasive noncompliance
with Brady violations, she refuted the majority’s conclusions that only a single
violation occurred, and that the District Attorney was anything but deliberately
indifferent to it:
From the top down, the evidence showed, members of the District
Attorney’s Office, including the District Attorney himself, misperceived
Brady’s compass and therefore inadequately attended to their disclosure
obligations. Throughout the pretrial and trial proceedings against
Thompson, the team of four engaged in prosecuting him for armed
robbery and murder hid from the defense and the court exculpatory
information Thompson requested and had a constitutional right to
receive. The prosecutors did so despite multiple opportunities, spanning
nearly two decades, to set the record straight. Based on the prosecutor’s
conduct relating to Thompson’s trials, a fact trier could reasonably
conclude that inattention to Brady was standard operating procedure at
the District Attorney’s Office.94

Although the evidence at issue was one crime lab report regarding blood-type
evidence, several prosecutors over many years engaged in various acts to suppress
it. The only thing isolated or unitary about the constitutional violation was “the
sense that it culminated in the wrongful conviction and near execution of only a
single man.”95 Moreover, the District Attorney’s cavalier attitude toward training
was not just “deliberate” but “flagrant.”96 When the supervisor had long ago
“stopped reading law books,” and the office had never disciplined a single
prosecutor despite “one of the worst records” in the country concerning Brady
violations, then breaches were not just predictable but inevitable. According to
Justice Ginsburg, “the Brady violations in Thompson’s prosecutions were not
singular and they were not aberrational. They were just what one would expect
given the attitude toward Brady pervasive in the District Attorney’s Office.”97 To
conclude that a “culture of inattention” does not constitute disregard for “a known
or obvious consequence” simply ignores the facts.98
9
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Justice Ginsburg’s dissent is an effort to bring those facts to light, not only
to expose the injustice to Thompson but also to explain the broader hindrance to
enforcement that the Court’s decision created. Lax training and monitoring allow,
or even encourage, prosecutors to ignore a right “fundamental to a fair trial.”99
Because “explicitly illegal policies are rarely put in place,” insisting that “liability
flows only from an explicit policy essentially immunizes policymakers who
simply adopt a facially constitutional policy, or institute no policy at all, and then
fail to prevent or implicitly condone unconstitutional conduct.”100 And
prosecutorial concealment “is bound to be repeated unless municipal agencies
bear responsibility—made tangible by § 1983 liability.”101
The intensity with which Justice Ginsburg writes in Connick emphasizes
her faith in the rigor of the adversarial system, and her view that it can only
function if defendants have full and fair access to court. For Justice Ginsburg,
Brady “is among the most basic safeguards brigading a criminal defendant’s fair
trial right,” and a Brady violation “by its nature, causes suppression of evidence
beyond the defendant’s capacity to ferret out.”102 Because the absence of the
withheld evidence may result in the conviction of an innocent defendant, “it is
unconscionable not to impose reasonable controls impelling prosecutors to bring
the information to light.”103 If a defendant does not know of a defense he might
raise, then he has not been “let in” to court in the way that Justice Ginsburg
envisions. Common sense dictates that defendants should not be compelled to
“scavenge for hints of undisclosed Brady material when the prosecution
represents that all such material has been disclosed.”104 Moreover, narrowing
definitions of prerequisites like “indifference” unduly restrict liability, and again
deprive the defendant of legal recourse. Arising together, those issues yielded
Justice Ginsburg’s most forceful piece of writing surrounding a question of
criminal procedure.

III. COMMON COMMITMENTS AND UNEXPLORED CONNECTIONS
There is an unrecognized connection between remedying unfairness to
individual defendants and Justice Ginsburg’s resistance to “built-in headwinds”
that have discriminatory effect.105 At several points, links appear between the
right to participate and be heard in the criminal justice process and her legacy on
equality. Indeed, an opinion emphasizing prosecutors’ duty to give defendants a
fair opportunity to present a defense fits within Justice Ginsburg’s small but
significant collection of impassioned dissents.
Justice Ginsburg has stated that she writes separate opinions only where
she believes them to be “really necessary.”106 She carefully “[c]hooses her
ground” when dissenting,107 and thus the decision to write at all is noteworthy.
And Connick belongs in the even more select group of dissents so expressive of
Justice Ginsburg’s core constitutional concerns that she read from the bench to
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underline the objection to the majority’s decision. An oral dissent, she has
explained, indicates “more than ordinary disagreement.”108 Most often she does
not “announce,” but when she wants to “emphasize that the court not only got it
wrong, but egregiously so,” reading a dissent can serve an “immediate
objective.”109 It signals that the dissenter views the majority as “importantly and
grievously misguided.”110
Ledbetter v. Goodyear,111 in which Justice Ginsburg delivered perhaps her
best known dissent from the bench, sounds some of the same notes as her Connick
opinion. The majority decision in Ledbetter, authored by Justice Alito, held that a
woman had waited too long to sue for pay discrimination even though she was
unaware for years that she was earning substantially less than her male coworkers
at a tire plant. Justice Ginsburg emphasized that private sector employees do not
ordinarily know what their colleagues are making:
Pay disparities often occur, as they did in Ledbetter’s case, in small
increments; cause to suspect that discrimination is at work develops only
over time. Comparative pay information, moreover, is often hidden from
the employee’s view. Employers may keep under wraps the pay
differentials maintained among supervisors, no less the reasons for those
differentials. Small initial discrepancies may not be seen as meet for a
federal case, particularly when the employee, trying to succeed in a
nontraditional environment, is averse to making waves.112

Because employees cannot “comprehend [their] plight,” neither can they
complain until the disparity becomes apparent. And as a result of the Court’s
decision, an employee’s “initial readiness to give [the] employer the benefit of the
doubt” would preclude a later challenge.113
What struck Justice Ginsburg about Connick relates to her central
objection in Ledbetter. There, the plaintiff first suffered exclusion from full and
fair participation in the workplace, and then was barred from court when she
sought a remedy for that harm. Ledbetter did not know that she was paid less than
her male counterparts until time extinguished her claim. Thompson’s dilemma is
substantively distinct but structurally similar. Thompson was unaware of
exculpatory evidence that could exonerate him while he spent eighteen years in
prison on a wrongful conviction. Then, though there was no question that he
suffered a deprivation of his constitutional rights, the Court constructed a
procedural impediment that precluded prosecutorial liability. Justice Ginsburg
also understood and expressed in both cases how foreclosing a remedy would
affect future employees seeking equal pay, or future defendants exposed to similar
unfairness.114
Congress subsequently passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,
accepting an invitation that Justice Ginsburg extended from the bench and
adopting the position she took in dissent. It is too soon to say whether her Connick
dissent might similarly inspire new standards on the Brady front, but at a
11
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minimum the decision has generated substantial commentary about the need to
reconsider the mechanisms through which Brady is enforced.115
Justice Ginsburg’s oral dissents have gathered strength across substantive
areas,116 and their broader strokes connect to her criminal procedure decisions.
Recently, she has engaged in some negative incrementalism on both affirmative
action and abortion rights.117 In Fisher v. University of Texas,118 she agreed that
the University of Texas’s admissions plan should stay in place but objected to the
decision to send it back for the lower court to judge it against a more demanding
standard, expressing some concern about the majority’s strategy to diminish
affirmative action over time.119 Moreover, in Gonzalez v. Carhart,120 she argued
that treating women as incapable of making the difficult choices surrounding
second-trimester abortions denied them equal protection.121 And she read her
dissent aloud to emphasize what she called the majority’s “alarming” ruling and
“effort to chip away” at abortion rights.122
Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg continues to make her strongest arguments
through a scrupulous understanding of the record and a common sense view of the
facts.123 Her dissent in Vance v. Ball State University124 challenged a restrictive
definition of “supervisor,” which in turn narrowed the conduct prohibited under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.125 In Justice Ginsburg’s view, the
majority’s definition of supervisor—limited to the person with the authority to
hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer or discipline an employee126—exhibited
“remarkable resistance” to “workplace realities” and would leave many
employees defenseless against those in their chain of command who could make
their work life miserable without having “tangible” authority.127 The following
day, in Shelby County v. Holder,128 Justice Ginsburg read a dissent from the bench
objecting that to conclude from the nation’s progress in protecting minority voters
that the voting rights law was no longer needed was like “throwing away your
umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet.”129
Insisting on the realities—not only of workplaces and voting districts but
of public defenders’ and prosecutors’ offices—has been a key feature of Justice
Ginsburg’s dissents. Employees do not ordinarily inquire about the salaries of
their counterparts,130 supervisory power is not confined to the individual who
hires and fires,131 constitutional protections can achieve some gains and remain
necessary at the same time.132 Nor do prosecutors suppress exculpatory evidence
in coordination with several colleagues unless the office in which they work
broadly tolerates circumvention of constitutional rights.133 The Connick Court
simply ignored the basic realities of a functioning District Attorney’s Office to
conclude that there was no deliberate indifference and that two decades of
conduct involving many prosecutors constituted a single act.134 A defendant
deprived of the essential facts necessary to his defense, and then precluded from
seeking recourse for that violation in court, has twice been excluded from the
system. And when the Court relies on these fictions to hinder judicial enforcement
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of constitutional rights, Justice Ginsburg views that as yet another failure of
process.
There is thus an extent to which Justice Ginsburg’s criminal procedure
decisions harmonize with the underlying commitment of her broader
jurisprudence. She is dedicated, she has said, to “the idea of essential human
dignity, that we are all people entitled to respect from our Government as persons
of full human stature, and must not be treated as lesser creatures.”135 According to
Neil Siegel, this belief in “equal citizenship stature”136 defines Justice Ginsburg’s
vision for “how government power should be exercised and how individual rights
should be protected in the American constitutional order.”137 Her criminal
procedure opinions are neither entirely consistent with each other nor perfectly
consonant with the discrimination decisions, but there is an intriguing and
important relationship between them.
Both sets of decisions, moreover, weave together fair process and equal
access. In the gender discrimination cases, Justice Ginsburg has treated liberty
and equality as interconnected values that “inform one another.”138 At times, she
has used liberty arguments to protect equality,139 and in the criminal procedure
realm, she has shown how equality concerns can safeguard liberty interests. In a
majority opinion in M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,140 written early in her tenure on the Court,
Justice Ginsburg recognized the relationship between equal protection and the
illegitimacy of “fencing out would-be appellants based solely on their inability to
pay core costs.”141 There, she held that indigent parents must be afforded an
opportunity to appeal termination of parental rights whether or not they can pay
for preparation of the trial record.142 The rationale in the opinion was selfconsciously imprecise because it comprehended more to the “essential fairness of
the state-ordered proceedings anterior to adverse state action” than due process.143
Justice Ginsburg also perceives some shortcomings to criminal procedure
rights conceptualized as constraints and instead concentrates on the government’s
affirmative obligations to ensure fair process.144 She recognizes, however, that
fundamental liberty interests sometimes provide the strongest support for access
to the courts.145 Consequently, neither the canonical gender discrimination
decisions nor the quieter criminal procedure opinions can be described through
“resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis.”146 The two groups of cases,
however, seem to coalesce around an ideal of opportunity, and an understanding
of the importance of a fair playing field.147

CONCLUSION
Though they have received less attention than other areas of her
jurisprudence, Justice Ginsburg’s criminal procedure opinions resonate with her
work against discrimination. Her conception of a fair criminal justice process is
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infused with equality principles, and particularly with the conviction that the
government should not foster inequality, and should work to remedy the effects of
past injustices. She has focused on expanding opportunity within adjudication,
more than on ensuring reliability or enlarging privacy in the ways that her
progressive predecessors did. Once criminal defendants have access—to the
exculpatory information that might allow them to mount a defense, to the
attorneys necessary to do so, and to a duly empowered jury—then she believes
that the adversarial process safeguards constitutional rights. That commitment is
an insufficiently appreciated dimension of Justice Ginsburg’s criminal procedure
jurisprudence, and a connection that both informs and amplifies her other
contributions.
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